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THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS APPLIED:
JAPANESE TELEVISIONS AND U.S. CONSUMERS
KENNETH G. ELZINGA*
I. INTRODUCTION
A common criticism of economists is that they never agree. At one
time, economists who bridled at this criticism could cite the law of de-
mand or the net positive benefits of free trade in rebuttal, for economists
always could be counted on to concur that the quantity demanded would
be inversely related to price, and that free trade would be a desirable
policy for a nation to follow. Consensus about the law of demand re-
mains, but there is now a demurring voice within the economics profes-
sion about the benefits of voluntary private transactions across national
boundaries.I
Economists who demur about free trade can hardly be called protec-
tionists. Andersonites might be the better term. In accord with Ander-
son's law,2 they are persuaded that any controversial issue, including that
of international trade, will, upon further thought, reflection, and exami-
nation from a variety of perspectives, become even more controversial
and complex. So complex, in fact, that the old answers may no longer
apply. As a result of the search for alternative answers, there is a new
learning among economists, sometimes called the new international eco-
nomics. Its proponents contend that the new learning may better fit to-
day's world of international trade.
The traditional case for free trade, taught to every student of eco-
nomic principles, is based upon the concept of mutual gains from trade.
Just as two neighbors who voluntarily make an informed exchange of
assets are made better off by the transaction, citizens of different coun-
tries also can expand their choice set and become wealthier through in-
* Professor of Economics, University of Virginia. B.A. 1963, Kalamazoo College; M.A.
1966, Michigan State University; Ph.D. 1967, Michigan State University. David E. Mills contrib-
uted notably to this paper's analysis. The author also wishes to thank Jonathan Eaton, John E.
Kwoka, Jr., Kurt R. Schaefer and Lawrence J. White for their counsel and assistance. The usual
disclaimer applies.
I. For an excellent survey of the field, see STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMICS (P. Krugman ed. 1986) [hereinafter STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY].
2. "I have yet to see any problem, however complicated, which when you looked at it in the
right way, did not become still more complicated." DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY QUOTATIONS
10 (D. Eisel & J. Reddig eds. 1981).
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ternational trade. The theory rests upon different national resource
endowments, with each country having a comparative advantage in pro-
ducing some goods and services relative to others. International trade,
according to the conventional wisdom, permits all countries to expand
their production possibility frontiers by focusing on their own economic
specialties and trading with others who do the same.
The new international economics is rooted in the economic theories
of monopoly and externality and represents a deceptively simple exten-
sion of these theories. Since monopolists make more money than com-
petitors, countries whose trade is conducted by monopolists (or firms
with significant market power) may be able to extract additional wealth
- in economic parlance, rents - from their trading partners than would
be the case if trade were carried out by exporters in competitively organ-
ized industries. This wealth can benefit the home country in the form of
higher profits, higher wages, higher tax revenues, or some combination of
the three.
The policy problem becomes sorting out those situations in which
this process might actually work. The new learning is not confined to
conventional monopolizing devices, such as mergers and cartels, but en-
tails identifying industries where economies of scale and learning curves
yield first-mover advantages. It then calls for promoting these industries,
so that foreign competitors will find entry difficult, leaving home firms
with a position of market power in export markets.
The externality issue revolves around whether market sectors can be
identified, the expansion of which would confer benefits upon other sec-
tors of the economy for which the unfettered market mechanism pro-
vides no stream of benefits. Such market sectors are generally considered
to be those with a propensity or potential for technological innovation
and interindustry diffusion of knowledge. If such industries exist and can
be identified, an activist trade policy that promotes their development
may confer benefits upon other sectors of the economy. A policy that is
even neutral to the development of such industries may inhibit economic
growth, particularly if other nations have trade policies that internalize
these external economies.
The case for free trade, implicitly if not explicitly, is based on trans-
actions being made in competitive markets. However, as economists spe-
cializing in international trade became aware of the focus on imperfect
competition done by industrial organization economists, some lost their
enthusiasm for the paradigmatic free trade model. Then, as economic
models of imperfect competition and strategic behavior were applied to
(Vol. 64:941
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trade between countries, the potential for government action to restrain
free trade became intellectually more congenial.
The impetus for the new international economics, however, was not
an accidental intrusion of oligopoly models into trade theory. Paul R.
Krugman argues rather that the movement also has been fashioned by
changing trade realities. 3 The growing importance of international com-
petition in the United States, the fact that trade patterns do not seem to
be based on natural or human resource endowments so much as on tech-
nology and innovation, the purported advantages of large scale produc-
tion, and even "accidental initial advantages" have combined to provoke
a reexamination of the case for uninhibited free trade.
Japan is regularly cited as the country most successful at imple-
menting the principles of the new learning on international trade. In
particular, its Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) is
credited with giving government guidance and support to target sectors
so that they can capture rents or generate external economies; MITI sup-
posedly hinders the development of less favored firms and economic sec-
tors in Japan.
One industry where MITI allegedly played a vital supporting role is
that of consumer electronic products. In his article on Japanese indus-
trial policy and the role of MITI, Kozo Yamamura singles out this in-
dustry, particularly the manufacture and marketing of television
receivers, as an example of "how the policy adopted [by MITI] directly
affected the market conduct of the [Japanese] firms in their efforts to
increase their market share in ... the United States."4
II. MATSUSHITA V. ZENITH
The data from a recent antitrust dispute provides an opportunity to
flesh out, through a case study, the new learning in international trade.
This particular antitrust case is especially opportune for detailed study
for three reasons. First, it involves the television industry, which
Yamamura and others cite as illustrating the benefits of an activist trade
policy. Second, the process of discovery in this antitrust case opened up
substantial detail concerning both the Japanese and the U.S. television
industries. Third, opportunities for empirical research on the new learn-
ing in international economics are not common. This is in part because
3. Krugman, Introduction: New Thinking About Trade Policy, in STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY,
supra note 1, at 1-22.
4. Yamamura, Caveat Emptor: The Industrial Policy of Japan, in STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY,
supra note 1, at 169, 178. See also id. at 178-85.
1988]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
the theoretical dimensions of the field are still developing and also be-
cause applying empirical flesh to the bones of oligopoly theory and stra-
tegic behavior has been one of the more difficult problems in industrial
organization.
A single robin does not prove spring has arrived, and a single case
study will not prove (or disprove) the merits or demerits of an activist
trade policy. But this particular international trade episode, more than
most, offers illumination about some of the issues raised in the new inter-
national economics because of the economic character of the industry
involved, the alleged strategy of the defendants, and the putative rela-
tionship of the defendants and their government's activist trade policy.
Through this single case study, a building block is fashioned for con-
structing an understanding of the potential for the rent-capturing process
of a strategic trade policy.5
Within a few months of the Supreme Court's 5-4 opinion in Matsu-
shita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. ,6 the case had become
a widely-cited and widely-discussed decision. What the Supreme Court
decided in only seventeen pages of written text came after millions of
pages of documents had been examined and thousands of hours of labor
had been expended before the litigation got to the nation's highest court.
Even by antitrust standards, Matsushita v. Zenith was what lawyers call
"a big case."
A. The Background of the Litigation
Some antitrust cases involve allegations of conspiracy. Some entail
allegations of predatory pricing. Matsushita v. Zenith was about both
conspiracy and predatory pricing. The plaintiffs' charge was that several
companies which were supposed to be independent competitors entered
into a conspiracy to charge predatory prices in one market while collu-
sively charging supracompetitive prices in another. 7 Several laws were
said to be violated by the defendants' behavior. 8 But the Sherman Act
5. The case study that follows is based on and draws heavily from the author's analysis in
Elzinga, Collusive Predation: The Case of Matsushita v. Zenith, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION (J.
Kwoka, Jr. & L.J. White eds. 1989).
6. 475 U.S. 574 (1986), rev'g In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.
1983), rev'g Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
Matsushita won at the district court level and Zenith won at the appellate level. Throughout this
article the author uses the term "plaintiffs" to refer to Zenith and NUE (National Union Electric
Corporation), the original plaintiffs in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F.
Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
7. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 584.
8. Zenith and NUE alleged violations of Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, Section 73 of the
Wilson Tariff Act, Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, and the Antidumping Act of 1916.
[Vol. 64:941944
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charges of a conspiracy to restrain trade and a collective attempt to mo-
nopolize were the focus of the action.
B. The Players
Matsushita was born in 1970 when National Union Electric Corpo-
ration (NUE) brought suit against a number of Japanese firms. NUE
was the former Emerson Radio Company, a U.S. pioneer in the manufac-
ture of radios and television receivers. Four years later, Zenith Radio
Corporation filed a similar lawsuit against the same Japanese firms, and
the two actions were consolidated. 9 The principal defendants were seven
Japanese firms: Matsushita, Toshiba, Hitachi, Sharp, Sanyo, Sony and
Mitsubishi (the Japanese firms).' 0 These firms are among the largest
business corporations in the world. In 1974, the seven firms had com-
bined sales of over $20 billion. Zenith and NUE are not "Mom and
Pop" operations either, though Zenith is much larger than NUE.
The products covered by the charges in Matsushita embrace the en-
tire consumer electronics products industry: television receivers, radios,
tape players, and stereo equipment. However, the case was fought pri-
marily over the relevant market of television receivers (televisions) in the
United States.
Televisions are a consumer durable familiar to virtually everyone.
They were originally the product of American and European inventors,
and the U.S. industry was the world leader in production volume and
quality until the mid-1960s. The birth of the Japanese industry came
largely through licensing arrangements and technical assistance from
U.S. companies. For example, American firms such as GE, RCA, West-
inghouse, Western Electric and Zenith, along with European firms such
as Philips, were prominent exporters to Japan of licensed technology.
MITI, according to Yamamura, was the "doorman" governing the en-
trance of this western technology into Japan."
The basic charge against the Japanese firms in Matsushita was that
they engaged in a massive global conspiracy lasting more than two de-
cades the purpose of which was to destroy the American television indus-
try. The strategy had two prongs: (1) charging monopoly prices in
475 U.S. at 578 (plaintiffs claimed that only the violations of the Antidumping Act did not involve
conspiracy).
9. For a case history, see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp.
244, 245-46 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
10. There were several other defendants, including subsidiaries of the Japanese firms and some
American firms such as Sears, Roebuck. Sony Corporation, one of the original principal defendants,
settled with Zenith, but remained a defendant in the NUE half of the case.
11. Yamamura, supra note 4, at 173.
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Japan, the defendants' home market, through a price-fixing conspiracy
among the defendants there; and (2) using the monopoly profits made in
Japan to subsidize below-cost, predatory pricing on export sales to the
United States. Zenith and NUE claimed that in the short run U.S. pro-
ducers such as themselves were economically harmed by the predatory
pricing and that in the long run American consumers would end up pay-
ing monopoly prices on televisions after domestic competition was elimi-
nated. Moreover, in the long run, the Japanese economy would benefit
from the monopoly rents, the pursuit of which is encouraged by the new
learning in international trade.
C. Predatory Pricing in the United States
Using monopoly profits made in one market to gain a monopoly
position in another market is not a strategy first identified in the new
international economics. The strategy is an old one, sometimes called
war-chesting, and in U.S. antitrust annals it is often associated with some
of the notorious trusts of an earlier industrial era. In international trade,
the strategy also has a long tradition as one variation of dumping.1 2
Most incidents of dumping do not have a predatory design, but predatory
pricing in an export market is a subset of dumping. In Matsushita the
defendants' war chest supposedly was derived from a cartelized home
market largely shut off from outside competition.
From the perspective of an American consumer, what happened in
the Japanese home market is of little economic consequence if predatory
pricing did not take place in the United States. From the standpoint of
MITI and Japanese television producers, a rent-seeking strategy to gain
market power is of no benefit if a monopoly position in the U.S. is never
obtained. 13 Accordingly, the economic consequences of U.S. television
12. Technically, dumping is any form of price discrimination in international trade. "Dumping
proper" is the form most commonly thought of as dumping, i.e., when similar goods are sold by a
producer at a lower export than home market price. "Reverse dumping" occurs when the higher
price is charged in the export market. See W. WARES, THE THEORY OF DUMPING AND AMERICAN
COMMERCIAL POLICY 3-12 (1977).
13. There is one condition in the literature of the new international economics under which
export subsidies might profit a country even if foreign rivals remain in the market (i.e., rivals need
not be driven out by predation). This may occur when domestic and foreign rivals (in the absence of
any trade policy) meet under conditions of Cournot (quantity-setting) competition. The result as-
sumes only one exporter and a subsidy that transforms the exporter from a Cournot competitor to a
Stackelberg leader. The subsidy could shift economic profits or rents to the country with the subsidy
in amounts that exceed the cost of the subsidy. The development of this result is associated with
James Brander and Barbara Spencer. For a summary of their work, see Brander, Rationales for
Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy, in STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY, supra note 1, at 23-46; Spencer,
What Should Trade Policy Target?, in id. at 69-90.
Jonathan Eaton and Gene M. Grossman show that this result pivots upon the competition
being Cournot in character. See Eaton & Grossman, Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under
[Vol. 64:941
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pricing by the Japanese producers and their resulting U.S. market posi-
tion become the first areas of examination. In a later section, two fea-
tures of the alleged Japanese home market conspiracy will be assessed.
These features are the economic evidence for joint behavior and the eco-
nomic rationale of using cartel profits made in one market to fund mono-
polizing activities in another.
D. The Mechanics of Predatory Pricing in Matsushita
Two Japanese organizations were said to form the heart of the ex-
port portion of the conspiracy: MITI and the JMEA (Japanese Machin-
ery Exporters Association). Through MITI, minimum prices, called
"check" (or "reference" or "benchmark") prices, were established gov-
erning the sale to the U.S. of consumer electronic products, including
televisions. Through the JMEA the defendants allegedly adopted a
"Five Company Rule" that limited each Japanese seller to only five
wholesale customers in the United States. Under the Sherman Act, it
would be illegal for a group of competitors to agree upon minimum
prices and to agree not to compete against each other for particular cus-
tomers in the manner described.
1 4
The plaintiffs contended that not only were agreements made by the
Japanese firms on the check prices, but also that there were additional
agreements to go below the check price minimums. This disregard of the
check prices was done, according to the plaintiffs, through secret rebates
and discounts to U.S. customers. Zenith and NUE complained that
these prices, or at least some of them, were artificially depressed and
predatory. There are, then, two alleged strategies running concurrently
here: prices that are predatory in the U.S. television market; and a collu-
sive agreement to put them there. The economic theory of predation
Oligopoly, 101 Q.J. ECON. 383, 384 (1986). If the rivalry were over price instead of quantity (that is,
if the firms were Bertrand competitors), the case supporting export subsidies or protection falters.
Eaton and Grossman also show that even under Cournot competition, the argument for subsidy
intervention does not hold when there is more than one exporting firm. Their work suggests that the
rent-shifting leg of activist trade policy is limited to situations of limited policy relevance. This
leaves only the rent-creating argument of the new international economics where an activist trade
policy endeavors to benefit a nation's export firms by assisting them in monopoly creation. Such is
the focus of this paper's examination.
14. While fixing minimum prices and dividing markets are both Sherman Act offenses, it is not
crystal clear how rivals of firms adopting such behavior would be affected adversely by these prac-
tices. In fact, Zenith and NUE should have been the beneficiaries of such tactics, had they been
carried out. If fixing minimum prices and dividing markets had constituted the plaintiffs' entire case,
the district court would have denied them standing to sue, because they would not have been injured
parties but rather economic beneficiaries. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F.
Supp. 1100, 1147-48 (E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'dsub. nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723




sheds light on the first tactic; the economic theory of cartels illumines the
second.
III. THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF PREDATION
Predatory pricing is a conscious strategy of pricing below cost on a
sustained basis to eliminate or discipline one's rivals in order to maintain
or establish monopoly power. When this strategy is successful, rivals ex-
pire or cede pricing leadership to the predator. The upshot of successful
predatory pricing is the monopolization of a market, to the detriment of
consumers of that product or service. The topic of predatory pricing has
been widely discussed in academic circles during the past decade;15 and
predatory pricing has been a central allegation in several important anti-
trust cases that did not reach the Supreme Court in the decade prior to
Matsushita.
In many antitrust cases involving predatory pricing, courts typically
examine evidence comparing a defendant's prices with its costs. The
most common methodology for comparing prices and costs used by
courts today is adopted from the economic theory of the firm and was
made famous in a 1975 article in the Harvard Law Review. 16 This
method, now called the Areeda-Turner test, entails comparing an alleged
predator's price with its reasonably anticipated average variable cost (as a
proxy for marginal cost) and rests on the assumption that a seller nor-
mally will not produce output if the market price is below the firm's out-
of-pocket costs. 17 In the economic theory of the firm, the average varia-
ble cost curve is associated with the firm's shut-down point. In a
15. The literature on predatory pricing is too large to cite here. For a selective introduction to
the topic and the ongoing debate, see P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 114-67 (Supp. 1982); Baumol,
Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1
(1979); Beckenstein & Gabel, Predation Rules:An Economic and BehavioralAnalysis, 31 ANTITRUST
BULL. 29 (1986); Brodley & Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Theories and the Evolution of Legal
Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 738 (1981); Calvani & Lynch, Predatory Pricing Under the Robin-
son-Patman and Sherman Acts: An Introduction, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 375 (1982); Dirlam, Marginal
Cost Pricing Tests for Predation: Naive Welfare Economics and Public Policy, 26 ANTITRUST BULL.
769 (1981); Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counter-Strategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263
(1981); Fisher, On Predation and Victimless Crime, 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 85 (1987); Isaac & Smith,
In Search of Predatory Pricing, 93 J. POL. ECON. 320 (1985); Joskow & Klevorick, A Framework for
Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979); Liebeler, Whither Predatory Pricing:
From Areeda and Turner to Matsushita, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1052 (1986); McGee, Predatory
Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & ECON. 289 (1980); McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil
(N.J.) Case, I J.L. & ECON. 137 (1958); Shepherd, Assessing "Predatory" Actions by Market Shares,
31 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1986); Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87
YALE L.J. 284 (1977).
16. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975).
17. As Areeda and Turner put it:
Recognizing that marginal cost data are typically unavailable, we conclude that:
[Vol. 64:941
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mechanical application of this theory, a price below the shut-down point
should cause the firm to cease operations.'" If the firm chooses not to
shut down, the inference is explored (or drawn) that the firm is engaging
in predatory pricing.
It is inherent in predatory pricing that the predator must incur a
short-run loss in order to impose losses on its prey. Zenith and NUE
claimed that the Japanese defendants did, in fact, sell televisions in the
U.S. at prices below cost. 19
A. Predation as an Investment
In economic analysis, predation can be seen as being analogous to an
investment. Initially, one incurs significant costs, in the form of losses,
during the period of predation. These losses are, in effect, an investment
in prospective monopoly profits. Justice Powell recognized this subtle
facet of economic analysis when he wrote that:
The forgone profits [of predation] may be considered an investment in
the future. For the investment to be rational, the conspirators must
have a reasonable expectation of recovering, in the form of later mo-
nopoly profits, more than the losses suffered.
20
Figure 1 illustrates and compares a predator's losses during preda-
tion and its profits during recoupment. Assume that the competitive,
pre-predation price is at a level of 100 and is represented by the distance
OH. The total quantity sold per year at this price is also 100 and is
represented by OC. Now suppose the predatory price of the Japanese
sellers was equal to the distance OF, and assume this unremunerative
price caused some U.S. sellers to leave the industry and others to cut
back their output such that U.S. sales were only OA. Assume further
that the demand curve remains unchanged.
(a) A price at or above reasonably anticipated average variable cost should be conclu-
sively presumed lawful.
(b) A price below reasonably anticipated average variable cost should be conclusively
presumed unlawful.
Id. at 733.
18. There are benign reasons why a firm may price below average variable cost. The firm may
be unloading inventory at distress prices; it may be a new seller engaging in promotional pricing; it
may be a new firm the output of which does not yet exploit expected lower costs due to a learning
curve phenomenon; and its average variable cost curve may not reflect tax considerations that make
pricing below this measure of cost profitable on a post-tax basis.
19. An economic expert for plaintiffs opined that four of the Japanese firms had sold televisions
in the U.S. at prices at least below average cost. The district court judge, for reasons not assessed
here, ruled that this price-cost evidence was inadmissable on the grounds that the construction of the
cost and price data was unreliable. Zenith, 513 F. Supp. at 1129.
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The total number of televisions consumers will buy during each year
of predation is OD. Since U.S. producers have elected to produce only
OA under the predatory conditions, the Japanese must produce the bal-
ance: AD. This means the Japanese firms' loss on each unit produced
and sold is FH, the difference between the average competitive price OH
(which is a proxy for long-run average costs, including a normal profit),
and the predatory price OF. Thus, the predators' losses in every year of
predation are depicted by the product of HF x AD (the shaded
rectangle).
Figure 1 can be used to assess the prospects for recoupment by the
defendants. Assume that when predation is over, the U.S. competition is
beaten back and continues to produce only OA units. This means the
Japanese firms cannot consider the total demand curve, as their own.
They will raise prices during recoupment to maximize profits over the
[Vol. 64:941
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"residual" demand curve, which is that portion of the demand curve
southeast of point K.
2 1
The predators' profit-maximizing (monopolistic) price during re-
coupment is 01; their level of output is AB which is the difference be-
tween the total demand OB at the recoupment price and the output OA
of their U.S. rivals. IH then is the profit on each set. The profit during
each year of recoupment would be the product of IH x AB (the cross-
hatched area). Based on Figure 1, a predatory pricing strategy would
seem rational only if the value to the firm of the recoupment rectangle
exceeded the cost to the firm of the loss rectangle. In the example shown,
(visually) this does not occur. But the rectangles represent only an an-
nual benefit and cost. The predatory strategy, in its loss stage and re-
coupment stage, may take several years. Figure 1, therefore, is a
heuristic device. A simple comparison of the rectangles, by itself, cannot
reveal the full costs and benefits of predation because of the tactic's inter-
temporal dimension. But Figure 1 does illustrate certain parameters of a
predation strategy.
B. Present Value and Predation
Economic analysis recognizes that a dollar tomorrow is worth less
than a dollar today. Consequently, a rational predator or government
bureau seeking to identify strategic sectors recognizes that the profit rec-
tangle during recoupment must more than offset the loss rectangle during
predation in order to compensate the firm for the time-value of the funds
employed. In a more careful analysis of predation, the discounted char-
acter of the losses would be compared with the future stream of monop-
oly profits.
22
Whether the returns to investment in predation are sufficiently great
to warrant the cost depends on how long and how far prices are below
costs during the predation period, the rate of return the predator uses in
making his investment decisions, the reentry rate of rivals during the re-
coupment period, and the length of the recoupment period. In addition,
the more inelastic the market demand is, the better the prospects will be
for a predator to become successful.
21. The profit-maximizing price for the predators will be the midpoint of the segment KJ for a
linear demand curve. Any price southeast of J on the demand curve could not be a recoupment
option for the Japanese sellers if they were predators since J itself shows the competitive price level.
A price higher than K on the demand curve is not an option either. With the U.S. firms supplying
OA already, nobody would pay such a price.
22. This approach has been developed in more detail and more rigorously in K. Elzinga & D.
Mills, Testing for Predation: Is Recoupment Feasible? (Feb. 1988) (unpublished manuscript).
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Using this analysis, Table 1 shows a series of conditions derived
from the economic studies submitted by plaintiffs in Matsushita. The
predatory price is expressed as a percentage of the prices that plaintiffs
alleged would have prevailed absent predation. For example, in column
one, for color televisions, the entry 62 reflects the plaintiffs' contention
that the average prices charged by Japanese firms during the period
1968-1975 were 62% of the but-for-predation price. Column two shows
the same calculation for black and white receivers. Both columns reflect
the deep discounting allegedly engaged in by the Japanese.





Years of 10 13
Predation












* The alleged predatory pricing cartel could never recoup its predatory losses. Declining
demand and increasing levels of non-Japanese imports and stable U.S. production levels would
shrink Japanese sales to zero at prices above 100% of the open market level by the tenth year
of the recoupment period.
Column one adopts plaintiffs' position that the period of predation
ran at least from 1965 (when the Japanese first gained 5% of the market)
to 1975 (the year after the cases were consolidated). Column two indi-
cates that predation in black and white sets purportedly endured for at
least 13 years. Given such deep discounting for such a long period, the
losses (or magnitude of the investment in predation) would be enormous.
It would have been unrealistic for the defendants (or MITI) to ex-
pect the output of U.S. television producers to fall immediately to zero
[Vol. 64:941
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under conditions of predatory pricing, if only because some consumers
may prefer particular features of U.S. producers, such as cabinet styling;
moreover, some retailers who carry a full line of appliances made by a
particular U.S. manufacturer may be slow to substitute a Japanese brand
of television sets. For these reasons and others, there would be some lag
before U.S. firms drastically reduced or ceased their television produc-
tion because of predatory price levels. But, if prices were in fact preda-
tory, predator(s) could, at a minimum, reasonably expect the output of
U.S. firms not to expand during the predation period. If domestically
produced output remained constant, as column one of Table 1 assumes,
the Japanese would capture all television sales stemming from demand
growth. This would have given the defendants 42% of the color market
by 1975.
The demand for black and white sets was declining during the pe-
riod under consideration. Column two's calculations ascribe to the Japa-
nese producers their actual share of the black and white segment at the
end of the predation period: 17%. Japanese firms in the manufacturing
sector at that time earned an average of 12.2% rate of return on assets.
23
If this approximates the alternative opportunity cost for the defendants
of an investment in predatory pricing and if 1.2 is a reasonable estimate
of the price elasticity of demand for televisions in the U.S.,24 the size of
the putative losses of the Japanese firms can be compared with the pro-
spective returns supposedly available to offset them. From this, one can
estimate how long and at what level remunerative recoupment prices
would have to be for predation to be worthwhile.
Table 1 shows the range of prices the Japanese could have expected
to charge during the recoupment period and the length of time they
would have to charge them to make predation worth the effort. The
analysis assumes that the rivals of the Japanese defendants sell the same
number of televisions during the years of attempted recoupment as they
did at the end of the predatory period. This assumption favors the pros-
pect of the predation strategy being successful in that it means the rivals
of the predators do not expand their output even if monopoly prices were
being charged by the Japanese producers. The table suggests that even
with this assumption, recoupment is impossible for the Japanese firms in
either of the television segments. If recoupment could go on for infinity,
it would not pay off for the Japanese firms in color televisions because the
23. D. HOLLAND, MEASURING PROFITABILITY AND CAPITAL COST Tables 1-8, at 9 (1984).
24. H. HOUTHAKKER & D.L. TAYLOR, CONSUMER DEMAND IN THE UNITED STATES 130
(1966).
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huge initial losses swamp the modest price enhancement possible during
recoupment. In the black and white segment, prospects are even worse.
Because of declining demand, charging the best price they can for black
and white sets (essentially the competitive price) shuts the Japanese firms
out of the market in ten years.
By the analysis reflected in Table 1, the pricing strategy imputed to
the Japanese firms by the plaintiffs in Matsushita requires that the de-
fendant firms act irrationally. Because the investment characteristics of
the market do not support a predation theory, this suggests some other
explanation of the events described (such as lower costs or higher quality
for the Japanese firms).
C Market Power Prerequisite for Recoupment
Economic theory characterizes successful predation as a two-step
sequence. The first step involves below-cost pricing to drive out or disci-
pline rivals; to exercise the second, recoupment, requires monopoly
power. A firm's market share often serves as a proxy for its market
power. A seller with a low market share in a market with several sellers
cannot dictate market price unilaterally. If it charges a price above the
market level, the price will not be sustained because buyers, by assump-
tion, have numerous alternatives. A firm (or group of firms acting collu-
sively) with a large market share may not have significant market power
either if customers perceive other products or services as close substi-
tutes, or if entry into the market is easy.
The economic study of markets does not offer an exact benchmark
for determining when a single firm has substantial market power (or a
group of firms acting collusively has such power). In a market with mod-
erate entry barriers, many economists would agree that for a firm to exer-
cise market power unilaterally it must have at least 50% of the market
under its control. Some economists would put the figure higher; others
might go as low as 40%. The existence of entry barriers would strongly
influence an economist's concern about high seller concentration. In the
absence of entry barriers, for example, even high concentration would
not enable the exercise of significant market power by firms in an
industry.
Notwithstanding the economic devastation supposedly inflicted
upon U.S. firms, the Japanese defendants' combined market share (in
terms of unit sales) of black and white and of color sets sold to U.S.
dealers never exceeded 50%.25 Japanese-made color sets exported to the
25. Zenith, 513 F. Supp. at 1322.
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U.S. went from less than 700,000 units in 1968 to almost 4,000,000 units
by 1976. The numbers are impressive but not overwhelming. In 1965,
the Japanese defendants supplied only about 10% of U.S. purchases of
televisions; by 1970, the percentage had grown but was still under 30% .26
If there were no collusion on export sales, a fortiori, the low market
shares of individual Japanese firms would suggest that the defendants
individually had no significant control over price. Indeed, Mitsubishi, in
its biggest volume year in the U.S., sold less than one percent of the black
and white and color sets purchased in this country.
27
Plaintiffs had difficulty persuading the court that the Japanese firms,
even collectively, ever gained monopoly power, or had the prospect of
gaining it to accomplish predation's recoupment stage. Economic rea-
soning persuaded the lower court that it was unnecessary to study or
ascertain the height of any entry barriers in the television industry be-
cause of the low market shares of the defendants.
While NUE and certain other U.S. television producers did exit the
business, Zenith remained a prominent seller. In 1973, the year before
the NUE and Zenith cases were consolidated, Zenith had 23.8% of the
color television market, selling more sets in the U.S. than any other
seller; Zenith was followed by RCA, another U.S. producer, which at
that time had 20.1% of the U.S. color market.28 I know of no evidence
that demonstrates that even today (some three decades after the rent-
seeking strategy purportedly began) the Japanese television industry, in-
dividually or collectively, has market power in the U.S. television
market.
D. Cheating in a Predatory Cartel
In the economic theory of the cartel, one of the most powerful con-
cepts is that of the cheater. Cartel theory teaches that when a group of
rivals collusively establishes prices at the joint-profit maximizing level, it
will be economically advantageous for any one seller to operate outside
the cartel rather than within. Outside the cartel, a seller-the cheater-
can enjoy the high cartel price but not be subject to the output limitation
imposed on insiders that makes the high price possible.
26. Id. at 1251. Mitsubishi owned no manufacturing facilities in Japan, so it is not evident
under the plaintiffs' theory of the case how it benefited from a predatory export cartel. It could not
use gains from Japanese production to finance losses in the United States. In fact, it is a buyer of
televisions (which it resells); it has no incentive to see the Japanese home market monopolized or to
do its share to drive U.S. manufacturers out of business.
27. Id. at 1285.
28. Id. at 1255.
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Most cartels seek to raise prices. Thus, the cheater typically is the
firm that tries to sneak outside, shade prices, and clandestinely sell larger
outputs. But in a predatory cartel, the cheater does the reverse. If firms
have agreed to charge prices below cost, the cheater's incentive is to sell
less than its share of the jointly mandated amount considered necessary
to drive out the rivals. The cheater concept has powerful applicability in
analyzing Matsushita.
Plaintiffs maintained that under the auspices of MITI, Japanese sell-
ers collusively set check prices. The check price minimums were to show
the U.S. government that Japan wanted "fair competition" and should
not be subject to tariffs and quotas that would be even more restrictive.
Then, to circumvent the check prices, the Japanese sellers offered U.S.
customers secret price cuts and rebates below the reference prices. Plain-
tiffs devoted some 2000 pages in their Final Pretrial Statement to describ-
ing details of this "rebate scheme." The documentation is a powerful
showing of the many ways by which buyers can pay transaction prices
that are lower than list prices. Zenith and NUE alleged that the prices
the Japanese sellers netted after violating the check price minimums were
unremunerative.
The factual record surrounding the check price violations is actually
powerful evidence that these reference prices were not predatory because
sellers sought additional sales at levels below them. It would be irra-
tional (as a matter of economics) to want to sell "more than your share"
at prices below cost, especially when such sales involved falsifying
purchase orders, shipping documents, export validation forms, and U.S.
Customs' invoices, entailed keeping double sets of books, and involved
other types of concealment. 29
It is, nonetheless, proper to ask whether the secret rebates and clan-
destine discounts might not have been part of a concerted effort by the
Japanese to move transaction prices down-perhaps without MITI's
knowledge-to predatory levels. The fact difficult to square with such a
conjecture is the apparent eagerness with which Japanese sellers sought
to expand their sales at prices below the check price level, a level that
allegedly was below production and marketing costs.
For example, an importer told Sharp (one of the seven principal de-
fendants) that Sharp's competitors were rebating off the check prices and
that if Sharp wanted any business it must be prepared to lower its prices
29. The Japanese sellers secretly would rebate to the customer the difference between the nomi-
nal price declared for export and import purposes and the actual transaction price quoted to the
customer. These activities did not violate the antitrust laws but they did expose the Japanese produ-
cers to other legal action by the U.S. Bureau of Customs and the U.S. Treasury Department.
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as well. Sharp obliged. When Matsushita was planning to acquire Mo-
torola, a U.S. firm to which Sharp had sold televisions, Sharp requested
Motorola executives not to tell Matsushita of its past rebates and devia-
tions from the check prices.
30
The only economic rationale for an eagerness to expand one's share
of below cost sales in a truly predatory cartel would be if a seller viewed
its product line as being highly differentiated. If there were great cus-
tomer inertia against switching brands, a cheating member of a predatory
cartel might covet additional sales (even during the period of predation)
knowing or believing that its new customers will not switch suppliers
when prices are raised later to monopolistic levels.
Such a prospect does not square with consumer behavior in the tele-
vision industry at the time of the alleged predation in Matsushita. Only
Sony, among all the defendants, had significant brand recognition, and it
sold at relatively high prices, not low prices. Large-scale buyers of Japa-
nese televisions and other consumer electronics products, such as a K-
Mart or a Woolco, who frequently attach their own "house brand" name
to a product, do not become wedded to a particular manufacturer.
Moreover, Japanese television manufacturers witnessed firsthand that
American consumers were not locked-in to their first television brand.
Many consumers switched from U.S. firms such as Philco and Admiral
to firms such as Hitachi and Sanyo when they purchased their second
television set (or replaced their first). Americans may be true to their
school, but they are not known to be loyal to the manufacturer of their
current television receiver, be it of U.S. or Japanese origin, when it comes
to shopping for another.
Absent substantial product differentiation, the economic theory of
cartels would predict the following type of behavior if there were a preda-
tory export cartel: serious squabbling among the defendants, each seek-
ing to cut back its own sales during the predatory period and requiring its
rivals to incur more of the per unit losses associated with each additional
television set produced and sold below cost. American importers would
be unable to play one Japanese defendant off against another trying to get
a lower price. If an American buyer tried to whipsaw a Japanese pro-
ducer by demanding a lower price (or what is the same thing, a larger
rebate), the Japanese producer would be eager to decline the offer and
graciously allow his co-cartelist to make the sale-if prices were below
cost as plaintiffs alleged. 3'
30. Zenith, 513 F. Supp. at 1247; see also id. at 1278.
31. Cartelization implies not only concerted behavior but also similar behavior. Rebates were
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E. The Economic Literature on Predatory Pricing
Legal opinions have many footnotes. But they are not often refer-
ences to economists. In Matsushita, the Supreme Court, to an extent not
often seen, relied on economic studies of predation to influence its deci-
sion. Justice Powell mentioned the "consensus among commentators
that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely
successful."
32
The word "consensus" is an apt one; "unanimity" would not have
been. Most of the historical studies of alleged episodes of predatory pric-
ing have shown the charges to be unfounded. They tend to support the
prediction of economic theory that predatory pricing will be difficult be-
cause of the large losses a successful predator must somehow offset.
Nonetheless, there are some economists who remain persuaded that
predatory pricing is, in particular markets, a matter of serious antitrust
concern.
IV. THE LAW OF ONE PRICE
Without using the term, the district court addressed the applicabil-
ity of the economist's law of one price to Matsushita. The law of one
price says that in equilibrated competitive markets, sales of the same
product will be at identical prices. Plaintiffs essentially were arguing as
follows: If a television set sells for $200 (in yen equivalent) in Japan, and
the same set sells for $150 in the U.S., sellers should increase supply in
Japan and decrease supply in the U.S. (on the assumption that transpor-
tation costs are not substantial). In the process, through competitive arbi-
trage, only one price will result. If prices do not equalize, the argument
continues, there must be a reason Japanese sellers do not expand sales in
Japan (the home market conspiracy theory) and do not reduce sales in
the U.S. (the predation theory). Capping off the argument is the closed
Japanese market (for which there is much evidence), which prevents U.S.
producers from accomplishing the arbitrage by increasing their ship-
ments to Japan. The difficulty of obtaining retail and wholesale distribu-
tion appeared to be one of the main barriers to entry.
not offered to all customers, and the amount of rebates, when offered, varied as between defendants
and between customers of the same defendant. Such disparate behavior squares more with in-
dependent rivalry than joint conduct. See id. at 1249.
32. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589. Some of the scholarly articles cited by the Court are Easter-
brook, Predatory Strategies and Counter-Strategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981); Koller, The Myth
of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, 4 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 105 (1971); McGee,
Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1958); McGee, Predatory
Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & ECON. 289 (1980).
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Plaintiffs offered evidence that compared defendants' home market
prices for televisions with prices for U.S. export and argued that Japanese
prices exceeded U.S. prices. Defendants claimed that this evidence was
marred because the economists' ceteris paribus conditions were not met
in making the comparison. That is, the sets were not identical in their
engineering specifications, they were sold at different levels of distribu-
tion, and they bore different warranty and distribution costs in the two
countries. The lower court agreed with the defendants' economic analy-
sis that these differences made the law of one price inapplicable. In fact,
Japanese export sales to the U.S. did not have a lockstep relationship
either to their own or to U.S. prices. Some of the defendants, notably
Sony, charged relatively high prices in the United States.3 3 Conversely,
some charged relatively low prices. Moreover, relative prices varied
among different models among the Japanese defendants themselves as
well as in comparison to their U.S. rivals.
There is still another consideration that argues for the defendants'
economic theory. If the price levels in the U.S. were the result of compe-
tition between domestic sellers, a Japanese seller without market power
who wishes to sell in the U.S. must be competitive with U.S. price
levels-regardless of prices in Japan or anywhere else in the world. In
short, if a television set of a given quality sells for $175 in the U.S., and
even if $175 exceeds the marginal cost of Japanese producers, it would
require neither a conspiracy hypothesis nor a predation hypothesis to ac-
count for sales by any of the Japanese sellers in the U.S. in the $175
range. Such sales are consistent with each defendant's own independent
economic interests and with normal business rivalry.
That Japanese firms often undercut established prices in the U.S.
does not itself prove predation since the Japanese were new entrants in
the U.S. market and the market is one where long-term cost reductions
led price levels downward over time. In markets where economies of
scale and learning-by-doing result in cost reductions, economic theory
teaches that prices will trend downward. Frequently, such trends are led
by the newer firms which are seeking to use low prices to help gain brand
recognition, goodwill, and company reputation. 34
33. Sony was an awkward firm for plaintiffs to fit with the others. The prices charged by its
profitable American arm, Sonam, were considerably higher than both the check prices and the prices
of Zenith and NUE sets. See Zenith, 513 F. Supp. at 1282. How Sony's high prices could injure
American firms was never specified.
34. The combination of established brand recognition, high combined market shares, and im-
port protection may explain the higher prices defendants enjoyed in Japan. Together they controlled
almost 95% of the Japanese market. But there is no credible evidence that transaction prices at the
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A. Economists and Inferential Evidence
In the U.S., price-fixing conspiracies often do not leave "smoking
guns": direct evidence in the form a written agreement to charge joint
profit-maximizing prices or a videotape of the conspiracy. Antitrust en-
forcement agencies often must use indirect or circumstantial evidence to
prove price-fixing. However, in Matsushita there was direct evidence
that the Japanese firms had, in fact, signed a document determining mini-
mum export prices on television sales to the United States. Indeed, over
time there were more than a dozen such agreements covering both black
and white and color televisions.
This is the language of Article 8 of one such agreement (The Manu-
facturers' Agreements):
The parties to this agreement shall not offer for sale, make a contract
for sale or deliver to export businessmen goods at prices lower than the
prices specified in attached Schedule 2.
3 5
Signatories could sell at or above the check prices.
The defendants claimed that these agreements were mandated by
the Japanese government through MITI and therefore were immune
from U.S. antitrust prosecution by the "act of state" and "sovereign com-
pulsion" doctrines. 36 The plaintiffs contended that MITI did not compel
joint action by the Japanese sellers and that MITI, at best, gave subse-
quent approval to the business strategy initiated by the defendants.
37
Regardless of MITI's role or the lack thereof, it is not clear how
Zenith and NUE (and other U.S. producers of televisions) could be
harmed by foreign firms setting minimum prices. Zenith, for example,
should have been delighted if Hitachi were hamstrung by legal mini-
mums. All Zenith would need to do to compete, on the assumption of
comparable quality and other terms, was charge a price less than the
minimum to which Hitachi was bound. 38 Moreover, jointly setting mini-
mum prices does not fit gracefully with a theory that prices are
predatory.
The Five Company Rule also was not compelling evidence of a stra-
tegic trade policy at work. First, the rule did not always hold: Several
manufacturing level were higher in Japan. Higher prices at retail or wholesale in Japan relative to
the U.S. probably are explained by higher distribution costs in Japan than in the United States.
35. Zenith, 513 F. Supp. at 1188 (emphasis in original).
36. Id. at 1187.
37. Id. at 1194-95.
38. Paradoxically, MITI and the defendants claimed the rationale behind the minimums was to
limit the number of televisions exported to the United States and thus represented a strategy by the
Japanese to limit or prevent even more severe US.-imposed trade restrictions upon Japanese goods
through tariffs and quotas.
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large American buyers, such as J.C. Penney, Sears, Roebuck, and West-
ern Auto, purchased televisions from more than one of the seven Japa-
nese sellers. Furthermore, the rule was easily circumvented: A
defendant could make its American subsidiary one of the five and sell to
anyone in the U.S. through that subsidiary. Moreover, the rule could not
have injured Zenith and NUE (or other U.S. producers). Indeed, if the
Five Company Rule had constrained Japanese sellers, it actually should
have made it easier for Zenith and NUE to sell to any particular domes-
tic buyer since that buyer allegedly was limited in its Japanese supply
alternatives. From an economic perspective, the Five Company Rule
runs contrary to the hypothesis of a low price export conspiracy. An
organizer of a predatory cartel might have to say, "you must sell to these
five" but not "you are limited to these five."
V. THE HOME MARKET CONSPIRACY
Price fixing in Japan was supposedly the means by which the Japa-
nese sellers financed the sales of televisions at depressed prices in the
United States. As sometimes happens in antitrust cases, when litigation
proceeds from complaint to discovery, legal theories change. The district
court noted early in its opinion that the war chest theory, which formed
an important part of the plaintiffs' original charge, began to wane as the
case progressed. 39 By the time of the summary judgment, the judge
wrote: "Little is said at this stage about 'war-chesting,' apparently be-
cause plaintiffs finally recognized that there is no evidence of it in the
record."40
Earlier, in a controversial move, the lower court judge had rejected
much of the written opinion of the plaintiffs' economic experts who con-
tended that a home market conspiracy existed. These economists re-
viewed written materials that persuaded them, circumstantially, that a
conspiracy existed. Much of this evidence was held to be untrustworthy
and inadmissible. For example, one JMEA document contained this
statement:
Thus, the businessmen involved have decided that, acting as one body,
they will strive to maintain export order and, furthermore, to aim for
39. Zenith, 513 F. Supp. at 1127-28.
40. Id. at 1129. Indeed after surveying many of the documents concerning the meetings of
Japanese executives about home market prices, Judge Becker concluded that discussions over home
market prices were often discussions over how to maintain retailer margins (which may have low-
ered manufacturers' prices) and conversations about how prices were dropping in Japan to levels too
low to enable manufacturers to break even. These were facts Judge Becker found difficult to square
with the war chest theory. Id. at 1203-04.
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steady expansion of exportation. 4 1
Economists for the plaintiffs saw such documents as evidence of conspir-
atorial intent. In contrast, the lower court judge interpreted the docu-
ment as merely expressing an intent to reduce trade friction between the
U.S. and Japan. He dismissed much of the work of plaintiffs' economic
experts as that of "conspiracyologists" and not the work of economists
qua economists. 42 Moreover, he ruled that making judgments about con-
spiracy based on circumstantial evidence of this sort is not the task of an
expert economist. Judges and juries are supposed to make such
decisions.
The issue of a home market conspiracy does lend itself to economic
analysis quite different from "conspiracyology." Without trying to inter-
pret the diaries of Japanese managers, or decipher the minutes of meet-
ings between executives, or exegete the notes taken by subordinates, or
discern the meaning of business memos, economic analysis can be used to
address these two questions: (a) What would be the form of a home
market conspiracy? and (b) What would be the economic rationale of
using the proceeds from a home market conspiracy to support predation?
A corollary of these questions is: To what extent does economic theory
teach that evidence of parallel price discrimination between two separate
national markets proves conspiracy?
Addressing the latter question first, the plaintiffs contended that
parallel price discrimination was such strong inference of conspiracy that
a trial was merited. The defendants argued that to go from a fact of
sustained high prices in Japan and lower prices in the U.S. to the conclu-
sion of conspiracy is not inference but rather speculation. The plaintiffs,
it should be noted, never submitted any evidence of the rate of returns
made by Japanese defendants on home market sales. They argued it
should be sufficient simply to show a price difference.
43
The history as well as the theory of cartels reveals their instability.
Cartels require coordination devices and rules of compliance to hold to-
gether diverse interests. The interests of this cartel would have been very
diverse and complicated to coordinate if only because of the asymmetry
of shares between defendants' sales in the home market and the export
market. Firms like Sharp and Sanyo had rather small shares of the mar-
ket for televisions and other consumer electronics products in Japan.
They were relatively large sellers in the United States. Without side pay-
41. Id. at 1231.
42. Id. at 1138.
43. Id. at 1205.
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ments, they would have been unlikely to absorb large losses on many
sales in the U.S. that later would benefit their rivals whose losses were
smaller, especially those rivals who, unlike themselves, had large shares
of the Japanese market and who therefore should be the firms with the
putatively large war chests.
A. War Chests and Alternative Opportunity Costs
Economic analysis often proceeds from assumption. At this junc-
ture, assume that the Japanese firms had cartelized their home market
and were making monopoly prices there. Assume too that the Japanese
firms are considering a predation strategy in the United States. Plaintiffs
in Matsushita argued that there is a connection or nexus between the
circumstances in the two sets of assumptions: A successful television
cartel in Japan renders more likely the adoption of a predatory campaign
against the television industry in America. The profits from one market
subsidize the other. This is the war chest theory of predation.
Economic analysis cautions against a quick adoption of such a the-
ory. War chests, like everything else in the world of economics, do not
come free. Their cost is the foregone profits that could have been earned
by investing the purported monopoly profits made in Japan in some alter-
native endeavor. The alternatives would include relatively riskless op-
portunities for the funds such as government bonds. No rational firm
would forego a more certain and immediate stream of income for a risk-
ier and more long-term prospect of gain unless the opportunities for the
future gains are very attractive.
If predation were an attractive strategy-that is, if it were financially
attractive as an investment relative to other risk-adjusted alternatives-
then potential predators would adopt this strategy of export pricing in-
dependent of their home market position. In other words, if a predatory
strategy (involving short-term losses) is a profitable investment because
of an expected future monopoly position, it is attractive regardless of
whether cartelizing in the home market (or any other market) also has
proven profitable.
At most, plaintiffs have posited a "convenience theory" of predatory
conspiracy: Since the defendants allegedly were meeting already to set
home market prices at high levels, it was convenient (as if someone had
said, "since we're all together anyway") jointly to determine predatory
prices for the United States. Agatha Christie might have sized up the
convenience theory this way: It confuses motive with ability. If enor-
mous profits were, in fact, being made in the Japanese home market, this
19881
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might have afforded the Japanese sellers the ability to finance a costly
predatory campaign in the United States. It does not provide the motive.
VI. THE MAN WHO HAD LOTS TO READ
Judge Edward R. Becker, at the time serving on the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, was the trial judge who in
March of 1981 first decided Matsushita. It was his decision that eventu-
ally was appealed to the Supreme Court. His opinion was extraordina-
rily long, a reflection of the Brobdingnagian number of documents put
before him. In 1980 alone, for example, 114 briefs and memoranda were
filed in Matsushita. Nevertheless, in reaching his decision, Judge Becker
relied heavily upon his own economic analysis as well as the economic
arguments placed before him. When all was said and done, and much
was said and done, he ruled that "despite years of discovery, the plaintiffs
have failed to uncover any significant probative evidence that the defend-
ants entered into an agreement or acted in concert with respect to ex-
ports to the United States in any manner which could in any way have
injured plaintiffs. '"44 Contrary to the conventional wisdom about Japan's
strategic trade policy, Judge Becker could find no admissible evidence
that "refers or relates to the setting or coordination of export prices...
or any other aspect of the 'export' component of the 'unitary' conspiracy
claimed by plaintiffs."
'45
There were many documents that revealed meetings about home
market conditions. But very few of these even contained references to
exports; those that did were to exports in general, not exports that were
U.S.-specific. There was some evidence that a Japanese trade association
(the Electronic Industries Association of Japan) gathered and dissemi-
nated average prices of televisions sold for export, but no record of ex-
changes of current price information, much less agreement on prices or
quantities of export. 46 Absent evidence of this character, plaintiffs' pre-
dation case becomes one requiring proof of predatory pricing by individ-
ual defendants. But none of these firms had enough market power, or
even the prospect of sufficient market power, to prey successfully in a
unilateral fashion. Judge Becker decided the case for the defendants on
summary judgement.47
The Circuit Court of Appeals was unpersuaded that Zenith and
44. Id. at 1117.
45. Id. at 1209.
46. Id. at 1207.
47. Id. at 1117.
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NUE did not merit a trial. The appellate court, applying different stan-
dards of plausibility, would have admitted much of the evidence that
Judge Becker held to be inadmissible, including the opinions and studies
of economists employed by Zenith and NUE. But upon appeal to the
Supreme Court, the highest court in the land thought otherwise (albeit
narrowly).
Matsushita v. Zenith, from a purely legal perspective, is about when
summary judgment-avoiding a full trial on the merits-is proper in an
antitrust case. If the facts about a case, as they are put forward by a
plaintiff prior to a full trial on the merits, are not in accord with eco-
nomic analysis (or "make no economic sense" as the Supreme Court put
it bluntly), then a plaintiff's case may be dismissed without a burden-
some and costly trial being imposed on the defendant(s). This puts eco-
nomic theory in the role of a filter, sorting out inappropriate cases from
those worthy of a court's full consideration. Matsushita adds weight to
the view that in antitrust, economic analysis counts. Moreover, Matsu-
shita strengthens the view that vigorous price competition is so desirable
and predatory pricing so rare that courts, to ensure more of the former,
should set a high standard of proof for allegations of the latter.48
VII. CONCLUSION
The new learning in international trade supports a targeted indus-
trial policy for exporting firms that operate under regimes of imperfect
competition. One basis for strategic trade policy is the potential for mo-
nopoly profits to be made by certain export industries. If a MITI-styled
government agency can change the industry equilibrium in particular oli-
gopolies to shift more profits to that nation's producers, that nation will
benefit from an activist trade policy. As J. David Richardson summa-
rizes the new learning:
In their stylizations imperfect competition among small numbers of
large firms make above-normal profit as fact of life. Taking such profit
as given, then trade patterns that give a nation larger access to it are
economically superior to other trade patterns. Trade policy can poten-
48. It was this concern that provoked the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice to be
a party to this litigation, filing an amicus brief. At the request of Zenith and NUE, the Antitrust
Division in 1977 and 1978 investigated the plaintiffs' claims and found them to be without antitrust
merit. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 474 U.S. 574 (1986) (No. 83-2004).
Charles F. Rule, who was then Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division,
appeared before the Supreme Court in Matsushita and stated the Antitrust Division's fears that if
Judge Becker's opinion were not upheld, the case would "offer strong encouragement ... to belea-
guered competitors seeking protection from the rigors of competition, and ... that's precisely the
wrong thing that the antitrust laws should do." Record at 21-22.
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tially achieve such desirable trade patterns. 49
Jonathan Eaton and Gene M. Grossman have shown the conditions
under which optimal intervention might be appropriate under various
assumptions about the number of firms.50 Grossman and Geoffrey Car-
liner have gone on to describe some of the difficulties and pitfalls in ap-
plying the theoretical apparatus of strategic trade policy. 51 They are not
insubstantial.
As U.S. firms face more international competition, it is appropriate
that U.S. antitrust enforcement reflect this new competitive dimension.
This already is happening in areas such as relevant market delineation
where the tools of economic theory traditionally used in domestic anti-
trust disputes are now applied to wider markets.
At least thus far, the new learning in international economics has
not made important inroads into antitrust involving U.S. and foreign liti-
gants. There is, however, little doubt that attempts will be made to adapt
the teachings of strategic trade policy to influence antitrust discussion
and actual litigation. The heightened interest that courts and enforce-
ment agencies have in economic reasoning is an invitation to consider the
ramifications for antitrust policy these new theories purport to have.
Moreover, the incentives domestic firms have to insulate themselves from
foreign competition make it almost certain that the new learning in inter-
national trade will surface as the theoretical framework for antitrust
cases of international character.
Any lessons for antitrust or for the new international economics to
be drawn from the experience of the Japanese television case are limited,
arguably, to only that episode. But three lessons do seem clearly taught
by the facts drawn out in the litigation. First, had the United States
engaged in a MITI-style trade policy to protect or cartelize its own do-
mestic television industry, whatever rents this would have generated for
the firms would have been at the expense of domestic consumers who
would have been deprived of the benefits of Japanese output, with no
prospect of offsetting rents appropriated in export markets. Second, if
the Japanese television producers engaged in a strategy to gain monopoly
rents for themselves or the Japanese economy, the policy failed. More
than likely, this strategy was never attempted. Indeed, given the restric-
tions purportedly placed upon the Japanese television producers by
49. Richardson, The New Political Economy of Trade Policy, in STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY,
supra note 1, at 269.
50. See generally Eaton & Grossman, supra note 13.
51. Carliner, Industrial Policies from Emerging Industries, in STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY, supra
note 1, at 147-68; Grossman, Strategic Trade Promotion: A Critique, in id. at 47-48.
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MITI, the question to be asked is not how does strategic trade policy
assist the Japanese economy but rather how much were Japanese sellers
hindered by MITI? There may be a third lesson at least suggested by
Matsushita as well: in international trade policy, one should not too
hastily discard the old learning for the new.

